I want to begin by discussing the Dea Boster article, because it speaks to the different ways in which disability was used to resist slavery. Slavery is a system of control and thus requires the ability to render behavior docile. Boster explains how "epilepsy's associations with madness spoke to larger cultural concerns about uncontrollable behavior; it is not surprising, therefore, that the most terrifying aspects of epilepsy...were its incurability and unpredictability" (277). Boster thus communicates how epilepsy represented a vulnerability of slavery because it presents the opportunity of unpredictability.
According to Boster, epilepsy was used in a variety of ways to undermine slavery.
First, slaves could fake epilepsy as "a negotiation or resistance strategy in the antebellum South" (290). Epilepsy was grounds for annulment of a slave-transaction, which gave slaves a way to disrupt the flow of the slave trade. Also, malingering represented a way for slaves to demonstrate the uncontrollability of their bodies, as explained above. Boster outlines how it is nearly impossible to distinguish a real attack of epilepsy from a feigned one, and that this ambiguity created fear and uncertainty among slave owners.
Second, epilepsy was used to expose the physical violence incurred by slaves at the hands of their masters. Many people believed that physical abuse could result in epilepsy, and that "epileptic fits in slaves were often linked directly to physical abuse" (286). Boster gives the example of Harriet Tubman, who was hit in the head accidentally by her slave master. Boster continues by outlining how epilepsy thus revealed the violence that took place against slaves by exposing the lasting effects of physical abuse.
Third, and arguably most important, epilepsy was used to generate support for the abolitionist movement in the north. Boster elucidates, "epilepsy...was used to shock and convert Northern audiences to the abolitionist cause" (286). This strategy utilizes the argument I explained above about exposing violence to reveal to Northerners the extent of the violence incurred by the slaves, which generated broader support for abolition.
Thus, Boster argues it is impossible to understand abolition without understanding epilepsy or attitudes regarding disability in the ante-bellum South. Mr. Kogan's paper also emphasizes the importance of disability with regards to abolition.
Mr. Kogan elucidates how Benjamin Lay used his abnormal body to generate awareness and empathy for the abolitionist cause. The anecdote regarding Lay in the snow serves to demonstrate how empathy regarding his disability was then redirected to create empathy for slaves who shared similar experiences.
Mr. Kogan also explains how the outcast position of Benjamin Lay allowed him to take up a public advocacy without any risk to his social standing, as he had "already lost official recognition in the Meeting" (5). Mr. Kogan's paper is particularly interesting because it traces the historical depictions of Benjamin Lay to emphasize how "Lay's disability played a critical role in the historical memory surrounding him and his advocacy" (11).
Here, one can see the portrayal of Benjamin Lay not as negative, but as empowered. Thus, it is possible to understand that Lay was not seen as overwhelmingly negative.
One should also note note how the medicalization of Lay's disability also created the perception that he was abnormal mentally as well, which "became an asset that gave him a tempestuous attitude and spurred him forward in his abolitionism" (7). The importance of disability in cultivating an abolitionist ethic is epitomized when Kogan writes, "This mind-body connection made Lay's unconventional and strident abolitionism intelligible to a nineteenth-century audience" (2). Here, Mr. Kogan explains how the idea of abolitionism at the time was not the norm; however, Lay's disability allowed him to take up this advocacy in a way that people would understand, and the nineteenth-century audience was able to create a narrative that explained why Lay was advocating for abolitionism (a result of his mental and physical disability, they believed).
Finally, the Nielsen article begins by outlining how white women and African Americans were disabled because of their "inability to labor" (56). This understanding shifts from a medical model of disability to a more social one, in which one is disabled by their social status. However, the article continues by focusing on the physical aspects of disability as well. I am not going to repeat much of the "disability cultivated an abolitionist ethic" because I explained most of that above, but on page 58, Nielsen writes how "abolitionists used disability to argue against slavery" by emphasizing the physical violence of slavery.
Before I pose a few questions, I want to draw attention to the question of intersectionality. The Nielsen article discusses how things like childbirth were different for women of color as opposed to white women, and how the situation was also influenced by the potential for birth defects. The Boster chapter's reference to Virginia explains how her "status as a slave likely had implications for the kind of treatment she would receive and who was responsible for her care" (279). Here, one can see how disability is also affected by question of race, gender, class, and so on.
Here are some questions to think about before our class discussion:
--To what extent was epilepsy as resistance effective? Were there instances in which using epilepsy to resist slavery was actually ineffective?
--While malingering may have been effective, could it also have been counter-productive in terms of pretending to be disabled? It seems almost like a commodification of disability.
--What happens if everyone gets to claim to be disabled? What are the dangers associated with equating disability with a lack of productivity (Nielsen) as opposed to a physical disability? Who isn't disabled through this understanding? Were all African Americans considered disabled?
--In what ways would our understanding of slavery and disability change if we focused on the more social aspect to disability?
--In what ways would an intersectional approach help or hinder our understanding of abolition?
I think the focus on how disability influenced the abolition movement in the readings and in Jaden’s post is really interesting. I think the effect epilepsy and other disabilities had on broader attitudes (mainly the abolition movement) is important independent from the more local or independent cases where tactics like malingering were useful.
ReplyDeleteFirst is the question of intersectionality. While the danger of commodification of disability is real and raises questions about the morality of malingering, I think intersectionality is a good enough justification. In both Mr. Kogan’s and Boster’s works, disability becomes a tool to advocate for abolition or to fight against slavery and racism. Jaden highlighted the time when William Lay lay (hahaha) in the snow to draw attention to the abuses of slavery. The other instance is when Lay destroyed his wife’s tea set to draw attention to the abusive production of sugar. By elevating his small and non-conforming body, Lay was able to make “his short stature prominent” which got the interest of the crowd, thus yielding him an audience that he could teach (Kogan, 4). This intersectional co-operation leveraged the situation Lay had and made him a far more effective advocate of abolition (which is probably worth the low risk of commodification).
I think that epilepsy was a very good strategy that was fairly effective. First, it assisted the abolition movement greatly. When Jaden talks about the Boster Essay, I think his second and third points indicate the same effect epilepsy had on the abolition movement. The stories of epilepsy and other pain were widely distributed throughout the North, fueling the abolition movement. Boster shows that it was the physical abuses in the stories that made them effective: “epileptic fits in slaves were often linked directly to physical abuse and cruelty in published ex-slave narratives and antislavery writings, which enjoyed wide readership in the North in the 1840s and 1850s” (286). So while epilepsy on the individual level, either real or feigned, had varied success, the way it assisted the abolition movement and guided broader societal views in the North proves its importance.
Additionally, I think another benefit of epilepsy was its ability to disrupt the legal and economic systems of the antebellum South. Boster notes that (the slave) Virginia’s trial was entirely disrupted because her epilepsy meant her “market value as a convicted felon plummeted from an estimated $300— not much lower than that of other young female slaves in Richmond’s slave markets at the time – to virtually nothing in less than three months” (295). There were liability issues involved with epilepsy too: should a slave be diagnosed directly after his or her sale, the laws dictated that the diagnosis “could legally negate the sale of an afflicted slave” (295). This benefit is important because it disrupted the frameworks that enabled slavery to take place; thus epilepsy was able to confront the antebellum South on a variety of levels, which is why it was as effective as it was.
Though it could seem like malingering and feigning illness would serve as successful reclamations of agency and rebellion, one must recognize the downsides of this strategy. For example, Boster explains that malingering served as a “tool of day-to-day resistance, not outright rebellion” (289). Day-to-day resistance served as the most feasible option for most slaves within the confines of a society that aimed to control every aspect their lives. Malingering did represent a personal act of resistance, even if it did not have substantial effects on broader structures. One must recognize the negative ramifications of this strategy for slaves, as slave owners recommended beatings and thorough and brutal physical examinations and tests to determine and punish malingerers (291-294). Moreover, the concept of malingering itself somewhat reified slave masters’ conceptions of slaves as dishonest and unpredictable, helping entrench that societal stereotype.
ReplyDeleteThe medical approach to epilepsy in both the context of the disease itself and malingering falls in line with Kogan’s discussion of the use of medical terminology to address disability. However, Kogan suggests disability and understandings of the body could be used as tactics for abolitionists (3). Though parts of the medicalization of disability brought with it negative portrayals of people such as Benjamin Lay, they also brought positive presentations of certain “eccentric qualities” such as “making homespun clothes and practicing vegetarianism” that abolitionists adopted in future strategies (12). Will also highlights how he uses himself to make a public display and generate “sympathy” (4).
Similar to Kogan’s identification about how for Lay, “abolitionist work and his physical non-conformity had become inseparable” (7-8), the Nielsen article emphasizes how certain aspects of race and gender became inseparable from disability. Scientific racism became deployed in gendered terms by relying on the creation of disability and difference as negative. Both the Nielsen and Boster articles explain how disability meant a lowering of value for slaves because it suggested incapacity. Nielsen interestingly refers to disability both in terms of lack of ability to do labor as Jaden points out, but also as physical harm created from the conditions of childbirth for women and from slavery for black people. Thus, Nielsen uses the category as both an ontological (for you Mr. Kogan) descriptions, used to describe how individuals were seen as deviant from society, and also as a concept to discuss medical justifications and labeling of physical differences.
Hello everybody. Jaden’s post about epilepsy as a resistance tool offers a new interpretation of the documents. First, slaves used epilepsy as a means of empowerment. Faking epilepsy, a major detriment to a slave’s value, could be used to get out of punishment or work. This can be seen in the Boster article. Boster mentions a story of Campbell, who feigned epilepsy in order to “secure his freedom from prison” (292). In this case, Campbell used epilepsy as a resistive force. Boster then argues that through feigning medical conditions, slaves exercised their agency in rebelling against their masters. By diminishing their own value through becoming “incurable,” they also diminished their master’s wealth and power.
ReplyDeleteNot only do the slaves themselves use epilepsy as a means of resistance, but the abolitionists in the North do so too. As seen in the Kogan article, Benjamin Lay compares his own disability to that of slavery through publicly exposing himself. “Lay vociferously chastised his co-religionists for treating slaves similarly” (4). In this case, Lay uses his own disabled legs as a metaphor for slavery. Through exposing his disability to the public, Lay called attention to the housing conditions of slaves (You see how these legs are doing in this weather, think about how your slaves are feeling).
Overall, the masters tended to view disability as a curable disease, whereas the slaves tended to look at the disability more socially. Abolitionists tended to also view disability through a more social lens in order to use disability for political means. In little rebellions, disabled slaves exercised agency in lessening their master’s worth and power.
In order to define disability, one must first define “normal” as it is often categorized as a deviation from normalcy. Mr. Kogan asserts that during the 1850s, there was an increased “desire to solidify a definition of ‘normal’” by medical and psychological professionals (9). I would argue that the harm associated with segregating abled bodied from non-abled bodied people is not the physical or mental barrier placed upon them but the societal barrier of being deemed as inferior and being marginalized.
ReplyDeleteThis brings me back to the idea of ablecentrism, were somebody’s worth or value is deemed by how close to normal one is. The slave trade was a clear example of evaluating one’s worth based on physical capability. As Boster argues, disabilities were a significant aspect in the value of a slave (295). Boster uses Virginia as an example claiming that her criminal record did little to her auction value, but her diagnosis of epilepsy valued her at close to nothing.
Virginia is a clear example to how since slavery, society (although much more moderate today) has deemed disability as valueless or a hindrance. Due to this fact, slaves began to fake disabilities in order to rebel against masters or to prevent being sold.
As Nielson argues, and Boster agrees with, the idea that masters “fear that their slaves, those deemed inferior in every respect, were outwitting them” (61). This clear power dynamic between slaves and their masters once against demonstrate how the majority looks down upon disabled people (in this case “mentally disabled” African Americans slaves).
When examining Lay, it becomes apparent that he used his physical deformities and outsider status to strengthen his abolition cause. However, as Mr. Kogan demonstrates, society deemed “Lay as disabled and explain his behavior as the product of a mental disorder” (9). As a rare counter-example to popular belief, Lay turned his disability into an advantage for himself and his mission, proving that physical deformities do not make one inferior and dependent but can still be “normal” and self-sufficient. As Lay is a public figure for abolition and disability, it is simply because society deems disability as weaker and incapable; therefore, when somebody like Lay accomplished what he did, it is seen as special and a rare occasion. While what Lay did was outstanding for the abolition cause, we cannot accept society’s definition of normal as a truth and better suited for society.
Apparent through the slave trade and Lay’s marginalization, we can see how society has deemed disabled people and, henceforth, as inferior and weaker beings. Although extreme,
The slave trade is a clear example of how society labels or defines a person based on their ability to preform physically or mentally. However, society must deviate away from associating disability with weakens as Lay is a perfect example to how a physical disability does not restrict one to an inferior and unsubstantial role in society.
In his blog post, Jaden speaks briefly to the use of disability in Abolitionists’ stance against the institution of slavery. I think it is important to recognize how this stance is a reaction to medicalized definitions of slaves and what these definitions elucidate about the interaction between the dominant institution and medicalization of disability.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Neilsen, as a justification for slavery, “Slave owners, medical experts, theologians, the drafters of the US Constitution, and nearly all parts of…society argued that both slave and free Americans were disabled” (57). Neilsen continues with a description of Samuel George Morton, who “proved that Europeans had…larger brains and greater intelligence than African Americans,” as well as medical doctor Samuel Cartwright who argued that slaves’ mental disabilities made survival without white intervention impossible (57). Understandings of black people’s disabilities ostensibly circulate throughout greater society, medical or otherwise.
In response, abolitionists reversed definitions that black people were inherently inferior, emphasizing “the physical and psychological damages wrought by slavery” as responsible for any perceived insufficiency (58). An annual report from a Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society summarizes, “He is weak and unable to move…because your dominion has palsied him” (58).
However, these responses only transfer blame for slaves’ debility, continuing to operate firmly within definitional norms for slaves’ disabled/ non-disabled condition. By establishing slavery as the underlying cause for slaves’ status as mentally and physically disabled, abolitionists must by necessity affirm that very condition. The nature of abolitionists’ response, however, does in no way undermine the benevolence of their cause because it still served to place slavery as caustic rather than paternal and slaves as equals to white people, but the consistency in definition between two opposing groups does highlight how even movements working to help underprivileged, disabled populations may operate within societal norms defining the condition of those they hope to aid.
It is also important to note the interaction between “objective,” medical science and the needs of the dominant institution. Because slavery required justifications that placed slaves as inherently inferior and needy of aid, science and medicalization produced objective findings enforcing the anatomical and intellectual inadequacy of black people.
In a more direct and defined representation of this interaction, Boster explains how physicians treating slaves “were in a position of precarious authority, torn between the needs of their patients and the prerogatives of the masters who owned them” (285). Boster continues that “communicable disease…were almost always considered a medical problem, whereas the results of physical abuse, overwork, or rape rarely were” (285). Here, medicalization and medicine work hand in hand with the institution of slavery, characterizing medical problems according to the needs of slavery and ignoring all that might undermine it. While obviously there are not currently institutions both as despicable and powerful in terms of influencing objective science as slavery, these extreme examples do provide insight into how the medicalization of disability and the sciences governing it may fulfill the needs and societal norms that greater civilization requires.
I was particularly intrigued by Jaden’s questions regarding definition and commodification of disability as a result of feigned epilepsy. Interestingly, epilepsy is a disability that is not purely physical or constantly present as opposed to apparent physical disability displayed by Benjamin Lay. Thus because “epilepsy was not always visible to prospective buyers” (Boster 296), it became a much less controllable disability and would thus be labeled “as one of the three ‘absolute vices’ of a slave’s body” (295). The lack of a constant physical marker of disability proved far more concerning in the slave trade and eventually prompted slave traders to have to advertise this condition due to the stigma surrounding the disability.
ReplyDeleteI found this peculiar as our past discussions have mostly focused on easily identifiable disabilities such as in our past discussion with the “merry cripple.” Disability frequently would only be defined by apparent “deformities”, but epilepsy would either be intermittent or would sometimes be unidentifiable. This led to many cases of people feigning disability or malingering. Most slaves who malingered did so for beneficial reasons, such as “usurp[ing] control by exhibiting the terrifying and incurable physical condition of the epileptic fit” (291), but slaves would commodify disability by faking epilepsy. Slaves appeared to commodify disability for a just cause such as usurping control from their master’s or challenging racist conceptions of slavery. Boster also addresses commodification of disability in the military such as how “malingering was a common device for obtaining discharge from the Union Army” (290). This instance of commodification appears to be for a more “selfish” goal as opposed to challenging oppressive racist systems, an act we would recognize as selfless and just. This then makes us wonder if there is any instance of feigning or using disability to achieve an end that could be considered just? Is it acceptable to fake epilepsy in order to challenge racist hierarchies?
Continuing with the idea of physically apparent disabilities, Kogan’s article presents an interesting instance of a physical “deformity” used as a method of challenging oppressive societal hierarchies. As opposed to epilepsy, it is impossible to feign a condition similar to Benjamin Lay’s. Although Lay’s physical disability often was tied to his mental state (Kogan 7), he still used his “deformed” physical state as a foundation for his activism. Interestingly, we can see that an apparent physical disability is more socially acceptable and less feared than a non-verifiable mental disability such as epilepsy or madness. This is shown in that the three “absolute vices” discussed in Boster do not include a condition similar to Lay’s. Perhaps this plays into the fear and confusion surrounding epilepsy due to its entirely uncontrollable nature whereas the Benjamin Lay’s disability is relatively easy to understand and control by society because it can be constantly seen.
I think it is important to discuss the effectiveness of epilepsy (real or feigned) not only as a form of resistance but also as a form of self-refuge. Firstly I would argue there is a huge difference between real and feigned epilepsy in regards to resistance in terms of consciousness. Slaves who were epileptic could not control the timing of their fits and therefore the slave themselves is unable to deliberately use an epileptic fit as a form of resistance. Rather, this type of epilepsy was used as by Abolitionists as support for emancipation. The “Race and (In)Competent Citizenship” chapter highlights that abolitionists utilized disability as “moral suasion” (58). In contrast, slaves who faked epileptic fits did so with a conscious intention to stimulate tension and resist their master’s dominance. Slaves pretended these epileptic fits at their own risk; Boster explains this confusing struggle as “How much [he] could resists his bondage against the amount of torture he could withstand at the hands of his abusive master” (292). It is hard to measure how effective these strategies were, however we do know that although most abolitionists did not support emancipation because of they truly believed in equality between whites and blacks, the inhumane treatment of African Americans largely influenced a portion of Abolitionists, especially women who also suffered from oppression. It is also important to recognize that when slaves pretended to have epileptic fits they may have been doing so in an attempt to not be separated from their family or to avoid being sold deeper in the South. This could be interpreted from an example in the Boster essay, where a slave recounts the “remarkable thing about his mother’s epilepsy was its ability to prevent her sale away from the family” (298). It is important to remember that when slaves were malingering, they were doing so to fight against or save themselves from an extraordinarily abusive and oppressive force. This truth left them desperate for any potentially effective approach to gaining human rights, including manipulation of the fear of epilepsy.
ReplyDeleteOn Jaden's question of intersectionality between the concept of disability and slavery I think Boster and Neilsen make several excellent points about why slavery, in particular, has several key intersections with disability. The first point is that slavery and disability go hand in hand because the conception of disability in the 1800’s was primarily one centered around a deficiency that prohibited the individual from meeting norms of productivity. Neilson argues that this is specifically applicable to the slave population because they were valued based on their ability to produce economic gains for their masters (61). Therefore, a slave that could not be productive was considered valueless and a physical or mental disability would have indicated to the slave masters that the slave could not be profitable. The economic value of a disabled slave was not only reduced because of their inability to do work characteristic of a slave but also because a disability made the slave “damaged goods,” something that could not be sold to another slave master to create profit. If the slave master could not promise that the slave was physically and mentally sound the money garnered from the sale of the aforementioned slave would decrease (Boster 296).
ReplyDeleteThe second reason slavery and disability are intertwined is the question of how disability changed a master’s ability to dominate and control a slave. The value of a slave, as mentioned in the above paragraph, was contingent on physical ability but also contingent on how manageable and compliant a slave is. Boster argues that epilepsy in particular captured the interest of antebellum slave society in the United States because the quintessential sign of epilepsy is uncontrollable convulsions (Boster 272). While epilepsy represented physical uncontrollability to the masters the mental competent that is considered a part of the contemporary definition of disability was another quality of disabled slaves the masters found to be uncontrollable. The mental inferiority of the slaves was “proven” with the pseudo-science phrenology. A slave that was too much of an “idiot” to work was worthless.
Intersectionality is an important consideration in disability studies because other people who were systematically oppressed by society, for example, the African-American and female population were often categorized as disabled. Likewise, these people had little to no control over the economic benefits of their labor (Nielson 57). Labor for both groups is contingent on physical and mentally normality. These people are valued by and on their productivity and the 17th-century definition of disability (mitigating productivity) is specifically applicable to those people who are only valued based on what they can physically produce.
I found the discussion on the positive ramifications of epilepsy in both Jayden's and Will's comments; however, I seem to agree with Emily in that one must recognize the downfalls with these fits of epilepsy. Slaves attempts to use this unseen disability to avoid bondage similar to how Denmark Vesey cunningly used epilepsy to avoid slavery in Haiti, could have given evidence to arguments made by believers in scientific racism. Not only would these actions had given agency to Slaves to some of the arguments made by scientific racism because it helps us understand claims like the laziness that was common to all of african descent. Feigning disability to avoid labor would make no sense to a person who believed you were in your destined place in society. Feigned epilepsy fits may have also given evidence to the belief that the African race was unable to feel pain. Stories like the slave, Simon's, in the Boster document were the epilepsy fit was compared to a "game" (292) where the object is to take as much pain as possible would have given believers of scientific racism examples where a slave was able to take more punishment than any white man would ever be able to take just to avoid labor. This does not disregard the positive result of malingering which often directly contradicted scientific racism. One example of this is a slave who "fooled" two white men with by feigning a fit of epilepsy. This contradicts scientific racism because how would the lesser race ever be able to consistently outsmart and trick the preferred race unless they aren't actually preferred.
ReplyDeleteI too was rather intrigued by Jaden's question of commodification. However, I differ from David's position on this question.
ReplyDeleteWhat I find problematic with the question is the idea of "commodification." The assumption that one could commodify a disability operates from the perspective that disability is something that can be defined objectively, i.e. a medical definition. The problem with this perspective, as we have discussed before, is that disability is not defined in an objective fashion, but rather it is based on cultural influences as well as individual experiences. In order to suggest that slaves were commodifying disability for their own gains, one must rely on what Boster describes as a focus "on maintaining control over enslaved bodies as well as on defining 'sick' and 'well'" (289). Boster describes that this process of defining the sick versus the well allowed physicians and slave owners to maintain power over slaves because it denied the slaves agency in their actions and control of their own body.
However, as Boster goes on to explain, epilepsy was feared because it "conjured deeply unsettling images of disorder and uncontrolled bodies" (300). If one adopts this interpretation of epilepsy as something more than just a medical condition, but rather an idea of uncontrollability and disorder, then the feigning of epilepsy can no longer be viewed as commodification. Rather, given the social perspective and construction of epilepsy, the slaves were forced to undergo such an act as a method of resistance, for it was a primary way to demonstrate the inability for the master's to control the slaves and the ability for the slaves to control their own bodies.
Furthermore, in order to answer the questions that Jaden poses as well as the question that David poses, I do think that the "commodification" of epilepsy is justified in this instance.
First, as I noted above, I am troubled with the idea of commodification because I think that it relies entirely on an objective definition of disability that excludes definitions that rely on individual experiences and cultural factors. The idea of commodification implies that one does not actually have epilepsy. However, even though slaves did not necessarily experience medicalized epilepsy, they did experience a sense of uncontrollability and a lack of control over their own bodies. Thus, as Emily demonstrates, the act of feigning epilepsy served as an effective form of day to day resistance in which slaves were able to express their sense of uncontrollability in a way that provided them agency while deconstructing the authority of the slave master.
Second, I do think that it was "just" to feign epilepsy. David only highlights the instance of the Union soldier, however does not take into account that the act of rejecting a sale to another state or evading forced enrollment into military service, is by itself a rejection of the racist system of slavery, for it is a refusal of the idea that slaves did not have the agency to dictate their fate. Furthermore, it relates to my last blog post about demanding that every action be a total deconstruction of the oppressive system. As Emily points out, this strategy was a form of day to day resistance that slaves could resist their slave masters. Also, as Sophie has isolated, it provided slaves a place of self refuge.
Thus, rather than view feigning of epilepsy as a commodification of disability, we must recognize that the cultural associations of disability truly embodied the position of the slave as lacking control over one's own body. Thus, by feigning epilepsy, slaves were able to demonstrate their condition, which Boster notes aided abolitionist movements, but also were able to do so in a way that provided them with a sense of control and safety from their masters.