Young and Linton both feel strongly about rejecting the "overcoming" narrative of disability. Linton criticizes it because it places individual responsibility on the disabled person for a problem that falls to society, suggesting that disabled people should just "work harder." Young criticizes the idea of disability as exceptional because it objectifies disabled people in a form of "inspiration porn." Adams et al highlights the produced and contingent nature of disability through the example of David who says he has Down syndrome "sometimes" (5). Both authors point to the creation of disability historically in both treating it as a medical condition and as an unstable category that can sometimes be used for political activism. Both Linton and Adams et al point to varied nature of experiences of people with disability as a challenge for activism and unification. However, this point seems to present the central problem of defining disability: How do you define a category of experience where the point of the category is that disabled people experience oppression on an individual level and in unique ways?
Adams et al makes a unique point by talking about how the battle for disability accessibility often comes at the cost of other groups, such as that of the oppressed workers who must build the ramps and technology used. Thus, Adams et al draws on the scholarly shift to theorize about "global" disability studies in order to counter its Western nature that idealizes Western attitudes and practices towards the concept of "development."
Who should get to decide what defines disability? Should anyone who says they are disabled fall into the category of disability?
Does Linton propose in this chapter a category or axis for disability? If she does, what is it? If she doesn't, what do you think it would mostly likely be?
Both readings mention the intersectionalities of disability definitions with other categories of identity such as gender and race, suggesting they all define their group as not part of the normal group. How can grouping disability with other identity categories prove helpful and how can it prove dangerous?
Young says that images of disabled people as "exceptional" produces well-intentioned compliments towards disabled people for managing to live like a "normal" person. How can we counter these images and feel inspired by disabled people in a way that doesn't suggest that superiority?
The Linton essay criticizes the medicalization of disability by describing how it casts disabled individuals as deviances from the norm (11). She contends that medicalization of disability allows for a fracture of the disabled community by bracketing off individuals into different medical groupings. However, the social model of disability creates coalitions that unite that group of people through common "social and political experience" (12). Adams et al. expand on this claim by saying "disability" is both useful in uniting individuals, but also in gaining legal legitimacy such that disability can be acknowledged from the political realm (9).
ReplyDeleteEmily, citing Linton, poses an important question: who gets to decide what defines disability? Linton argues that allowing too broad self-definition allows a mindset where "everyone is disabled in some way, shape, or form," which commodifies a disabled person's embodied experience. In other words, if everyone can self-identify as disabled, then those who experience social obstacles as a result of their more embodied disability will simply be ignored because those that have a sort of able-bodied privilege will make claims about why everyone is disabled and we shouldn't focus on anyone's individual relationship to ableism because, "we're all disabled!"
Before responding to some of Emily's other questions, I want to draw attention to the part of the Linton article that discusses the rhetoric surrounding disability. She explains how many words, such as cripple, gimp, freak, etc., are all used derogatorily by ableist individuals. However, she elucidates how these words can be liberating if used by the disabled community because they operate as a way for disabled people to describe their own experiences, and reclaiming those words allows them to do that.
I think Linton deliberately chooses to not name an explicit axis or category for disability. Creating a static category would most likely reify the exclusions that Linton identifies that result from these universal definitions of certain groups of people (for example, when she references Eve Sedgwick and "Epistemology of the Closet"). However, I think Linton subtly creates a new axis for disability when she refers to able-bodied people as "nondisabled." She argues that this rhetoric centers disability, which flips the script and makes able-bodies the "outside." While this doesn't necessarily create a definition or axis that answers the question "who is included into the category of disabled," it questions the perception of "disabled as exclusion" and creates a mindset shift that allows people to challenge the underlying presumptions about disability that define society.
This notion is exemplified in the TED talk, when Stella Young describes how a narrative of "overcoming" disability and becoming an inspiration recreates these inside/outside divides that characterize society. She and Linton argue that this narrative of overcoming creates the sense that a disabled person has to prevail against certain obstacles in order to finally be included into the "norm" of civilization. Young continues by explaining how “heroizing” this narrative creates a sort of pseudo-inclusion where disabled people are integrated into society but are still marked as deviant when people tell them, "wow, you are such an inspiration!" This rhetoric creates an understanding of disability that reifies exclusion by implying that disabled people have to work harder than "normal" people to fit within society, and thus, their inclusion is never complete, because there are daily reminders of their exclusion.
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ReplyDeleteWith regards to the question about intersectionality, there are both benefits and drawbacks of an intersectional approach to disability. I think that grouping disability with other identity categories, such as femininity, queerness, race, class, etc, is problematic because it equivocates those different social statuses. For example, one could logically say that an able-bodied woman is disabled because of her social status in a world of patriarchy. This understanding is problematic because it extends the category of disability to those who might not have an embodied relationship with it, but are rather disadvantaged as a result of a dominant system of power that doesn't necessarily have to do with ableism (such as capitalism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, and so on). This footnotes disability itself and leads to the sort of "everyone is disabled" mentality that I explained above. However, this understanding is distinct from intersectionality in my opinion. Linton explains how we must interrogate the white, heterosexual, upper class, male if we are to understand able-bodied privilege, because there are a litany of factors that extend beyond just disability that create one's lived conditions. For example, a disabled person on welfare experiences ableism in a much different way than a disabled person with an income of $500,000 a year. Understanding these differences through the lens of disability both allows us to examine other aspects of identity, while continuing to build the coalitions that result from an understanding of disability that says people share similar experiences. Adams et al. explain how we cannot separate aspects of disability studies from other fields, such as capitalism studies. They give the example of how "disability" overlaps in the dictionary with "debility," but the latter connotes a sense of "pecuniary weakness" (10). Understanding "disability" as "debility" thus contributes to a system of capitalist domination that produces exclusion by identifying certain bodies as unproductive monetarily. Understanding the interconnections between the two fields is necessary to prevent a disability studies field that contributes to strengthening a system of capitalism.
I have already explained why the "well-intentioned compliments" Emily isolates produce pseudo-inclusion. I think Linton's claim about how defining the able-bodied as "nondisabled" is a productive way to counter these images of inspiration, because that definition centers disability as the norm and interrupts the narrative of "overcoming disability to achieve inclusion." This shift in our mindset prevents these almost condescending compliments by understanding disability as something other than an obstacle one has to overcome to achieve inclusion. This understanding portrays disability as more of an everyday reality rather than an inspiration to other people that share the same social location.
Something I found while researching was an interesting article about why "differently-abled" is problematic because it is both euphemistic and centers the notion that there is a norm of "able-body." This article seems to further elucidate why this form of pseudo-inclusion (such as the well-intention compliments explained above) actually furthers exclusion: http://www.autistichoya.com/2013/08/differently-abled.html
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I was particularly interested in the last question Emily posed. To start, I think that Young explains the commodification of people we draw inspiration from, but I think a problem with this commodification is how to negotiate any inspiration. Non-disabled people can also be sources of inspiration, and they are sources of inspiration because of something they have done. Yet what they have done is extraordinary. I think that’s where it gets tricky. Doing something extraordinary implies surpassing a norm. Linton sums up the norm problem, arguing “the medicalization of disability casts human variation as deviance from the norm” (11). So being inspirational is tied to the norm, which makes all disabled people inspirational. The way to feel inspired by disabled people while avoiding the commodification thus requires identifying which deviance from norms is something we should aspire to; aspiration avoids the problem Young cites because she argues the bad inspiration stems from keeping disabled people “there so that you can look at them and think that things aren't so bad for you, to put your worries into perspective” (Young). By focusing on actual achievement, inspiration can be drawn from anybody, regardless of ability.
ReplyDeleteHowever, the focus on achievement is far from perfect. It still plays into the problems of “overcoming” that Linton points out (17). While acknowledging that being “congratulated for getting out of bed and remembering … names in the morning” is not something to draw inspiration from, it seems near impossible to remove the strings of ability (Young). For example, running a marathon is something that is nice, and maybe even inspirational, but should a person with prosthetic legs run a marathon, the feat suddenly becomes inspirational for completing it in a way separate from the norm. That separation from the norm is overcoming, which is problematic. So if we want to counter the commodification while still allowing the possibility to feel inspired by disabled people in a way that doesn’t suggest superiority, the focus on achievement would be similar to “color-blindness.” That model, however, has its own problems, for ignoring difference isn’t necessarily a good thing. So, in a way, inspiration on the whole has issues with commodification and before contemplating how to draw inspiration from disabled people in a way that doesn’t communicate superiority we must focus on NOT celebrating non-achievements.
In regard to Emily’s question discussing who should be allowed to define disability, I think it is important to first establish the status quo for this issue before we can suggest an alternative. As far as self-definition, the Linton article recognizes that disabled groups do have power: “Disabled people have gained greater control over these definitional issues. The Disabled or the handicapped was replaced in the mid-70s by people with disabilities” in order to emphasize disability as only a characteristic of a greater individual (13). In similar, albeit more rebellious, fashion, Linton references the fact that “Cripple has also been revived by some in the disability community who refer to each other as “crips” or “cripples” (17). Both of these examples seem to establish disabled groups’ ability to define themselves even in terms uncomfortable to the general public and reorient discussion of their position. However, external societal norms do infiltrate into these stances, continuing to dominate definitions. As a reactionary identification, the usage of “cripple” holds its significance almost entirely from its deviancy, rebelling against societal perceptions of what is acceptable to label disabled people. Instead of a purposeful redefinition, this intentionally jarring language seems to recognize the powerless of the group to claim authority in the discussion of disabled people’s identity. Furthermore, while the disabled community has been able to reorient discourse to maintain the individuality of those with disability, society still holds the power to dictate how they should feel about and react to their condition. This circumstance asserts itself most prominently in widespread narratives of overcoming, where disabled people may only achieve excellence by conquering a state of assumed inferiority and misery (Linton 15-16).
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In regard to the exact question Emily asked discussing identification as either disabled or nondisabled, there have been cases of a person who might conventionally and medically be identified as disabled choosing to hide their impairment and identify ostensibly as nondisabled (Linton 19). However, Linton notes that these definitions “may be a deliberate effort to avoid discrimination or ostracism,” and therefore represent a reaction to the harsh definition of utility and acceptability that society continues to impose on disabled people rather than an active, free choice made independently (19). That a person should decide to hide certain attributes for fear of differing treatment as a result of immediate identification as disabled indicates to me that boundaries are both defined and rigid, continuing to be established by society. At this point, society seems to hold great power in defining what disability means and where it begins and ends. Nonetheless, what would happen should a person decide to mediate the boundaries alone, independent of societal controls? Linton discusses this behavior when noting that some stances only require that a person say they are disabled to identify as one (12). Acknowledging realities, Linton continues that “that declaration won’t satisfy a worker’s compensation board” (12). Here, we come up against practical barriers preventing the transfer of identification from society to disabled people themselves. While anyone might decide individually that they identify as disabled, there exist many structures within society that all must interact with which hold standardized, static definitions of disability, disallowing any deviancy from the established norm by way of their own power. Although disabled people are often held apart, they still must interact with frameworks in society which will define them. As a result, it seems that the status quo asserts the power of society in defining who is disabled. Of course, allowing the identification of disability to be internal rather than external is the most desirable mechanism for definition, but it must be asked whether that goal is practical. At its core, the question is if it’s practical or even possible for society to relinquish control of categorization to individuals alone.
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ReplyDeleteEmily poses an intriguing question about who or what defines a disability. While historically many texts and dictionaries define “the term disability…to signify something material and concrete, a physical or psychological condition considered to have predominantly medical significance,” it is imperative that this category does not label or limit disability to only medical relevance (linton, 10). After society’s original acceptance of disability as a medical hindrance, it has become so deeply engrained in society’s policies and practices that it has actively refused to alter or adjust its definition. Society’s confinement and exclusion of disabled groups not only puts a social burden on them but also an identity marker; it marks them as different from societal norms, and they are no longer seen as equal but inferior. Linton goes as far to argue that like racism, them medical definition of disability “separates people according to biomedical condition through the use of diagnostic categories and to forefront medical perspective on human variation” (12). There is an expectation of people to either fit in the category of disable or non-disabled creating a binary within society. The last problem with the status quo’s medical definition of disabled remains the most important: a medical problem can treated and eventually overcame. Society places the blame on person’s inability to “fix” his/her “disability” individualizing the problem instead of demanding society to change (Linton, 22). By claiming it is a medical problem, society expects the individual to change in order to conform to social norms while society remains segregated between the “abled bodied” and the “disabled bodied.” So while what qualifies as a disability remains unclear and fluid, what is clear is that disability is no long restricted to only medical conditions.
This idea of social expectations leads into Emily’s next question regarding countering the image of putting disabled people on a pedestal for managing to live a “normal” life and still feel inspired by their work without unconsciously demonstrating superiority. It is fundamentally impossible to promote equality between two different groups when one group objectifying another for their benefit (Stella). Stella Young brilliantly highlights the mindset of these “inspirational” posters of disabled people by claiming that reason they are inspiring is due to the fact one looks at the poster and thinks, “well, however bad my life is, it could be worse. I could be that person.” On the other hand, socially attempting to integrate and “normalize” one’s disability remains just as harmful as objectifying and glorifying one. Linton argues that concealing body parts or hearing impairments suggests that a disability is shameful; the family’s attempt to hide a disability merely represents their desire to make them appear “more normal” (20). Moreover, the message is that one’s disability is socially unacceptable and as long as he/she changes to fit social norms, he/she can be like everybody else: normal. On the contrary, Young rejects the idea of claiming everybody is disabled because it is not true. No matter how optimistic somebody in a wheel chair is, the stairs are not going to transform into a ramp. Therefore, I feel that that it is impossible to glorify disabled people without subtly suggesting inferiority. Young along with many others do not want to be praised; they want society to change to accept them instead of marginalizing them as dependent and lesser.
With regards to Emily's question about defining disability, I think that the Linton chapter offers some significant insight. First, the power of the medical model rests in its definitions. Distinctions in the rhetoric of disability shape public opinion and foster a view of dependance. For example, Linton writes that "phrases such as the woman is a victim of cerebral palsy implies an active agent... perpetrating an aggressive act on a vulnerable, helpless 'victim'" (25). Through fostering a restrictive view of disabled people, the medical module restricts the discussion to one side- a quest for a cure to the disabled problem. This single viewpoint is problematic, and can often lead to misconceptions of disabled people. As we have seen in the Stella Young ted talk, a restricted view of disabled people will lead to scenarios such as when the student asked Stella Young when will she inspire him.
ReplyDeleteIn addition to the importance of reforming the current definitions of disability, it is important that disability be kept an open term. As the world becomes more fluid in beliefs, many more kinds of disability will surely arise, and thus a closed definition will ostracize many. Thus, an individual definition of disability would benefit the community overall. By allowing individuals to define disability for themselves, more dialogues will arise, and an overall better understanding of disability will happen.
Also, an individually determined definition of disability would allow more disabled people to see themselves as a functioning member of society- not a castaway of the public. Stella Young touched on this idea when recalling how she was nominated for an award when all she did was watch TV. This universal enablement (the good kind) would allow disabled people to evaluate themselves alongside every other able-bodied person because their individual definition would probably not include any of the societal constructed barriers (ex: victimization, passing, overcoming).
Lastly, an individually determined definition would not close any doors for disabled people. As chiché as it sounds, by creating a definition for oneself, a person could decide for him/herself what he/she can do. For example, as seen in pages 20 and 21 in the Linton chapter, if somebody who tries to pass for being nondisabled defined his/her own disability, he/she could potentially find the confidence to "come out" and find his/her own happiness.
Thanks Emily for the interesting post.
- Max
Regarding Emily's question about identification as disabled, we must recognize different methods of identification in different contexts in order to fully interrogate the assumptions behind this form of identity. For example, a legal definition regarding disability may vastly differ from a social or scholarly definition. Linton alludes to this instance by pointing out that purely self identification as disabled "won't satisfy a worker's compensation board" (12). This proves problematic because a person who may self identify as "disabled" may not be considered legally "disabled," thus removing credibility to forms of oppression or disadvantage experienced in one's life. Following Jaden's point regarding the idea that "we're all disabled in some way," this leads to a very convoluted area in a political sphere. Of course (one might argue), if we are all disabled, then in some way the government would all owe us worker's compensation. This is not only impossible, but would also fail to recognize real forms of oppression in society. Governmental or political definitions may also be inherently problematic as they attempt to categorize and constrict a person's identification and historically entrench "passivity and victimization" (Linton 25).
ReplyDeleteBut then how do we acknowledge disability in a way that acknowledges actual oppression, rejects political and social stereotypes, and "links this disparate group of people" (Linton 9)? This question is most likely not answerable, especially because it differs by context as well as by person. Adams, Reiss, and Serlin's refer to David stating that he "sometimes" has Down syndrome to further show this impossibility of identification. Although David physically experiences and genetically has Down syndrome, it "is not a defining feature of his home and family life" (5). But in a political context how would one define David? How about in a scholarly context? These forms of identification must differ by context as a single term will not successfully encompass all areas of life. Companied with the fluidity of disability, is it ever possible to define a person by their ability or disability? Is it productive or even necessary to do so?
For this post I will focus on the idea of social and/or self-identification regarding disability. The Linton article refers to instances of disability and ability in opposition to each other, stating "Disability is the 'not' condition, the repudiation of ability" (30). This identification in opposition to society can prove beneficial in some instances but can also have major drawbacks. The definition provides for an easy explanation of identity: "I am different from the rest of you." It also provides for a clear boundary of what one supports or does not support in society. But, it can also reify societal binaries by placing the identity of one society in the control of the other. Thus the word "disability' in and of itself appears problematic because it relies on the larger system of ability to define itself.
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Perhaps it is more productive to focus on different methods of identification that do not necessitate this form of binarization. In an essay we had to read over the summer for English, "On Being a Cripple" by Nancy Mairs, the author chooses to identify herself as a "cripple." She acknowledges that this identification should not be used for all people and that she purely refers to herself as such, but it reveals another method of identification, self identification that acknowledges disability but also uses personalized nomenclature. David (referenced in the Adams et. al chapter) also represents this idea in that he determines for himself when he has Down syndrome. This form of personal identification does not provide the same solidarity or community as broader terms like "disability," but seems acknowledges the difference and fluidity of disability at the same time.
ReplyDeleteOverall, identification as disabled requires multiple definitions depending on context as well as the person. This identification must be found on a personal level but also interrogated on a societal level. Although "'disability' has now become the preferred term" (Adams et. al 7), each person must define their own disability in order to understand this identity.
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Patrick makes an excellent point in considering the practicality of the social model of disability. While it would obviously be the ideal situation that disability could be solely based on individualized definitions, how does that intersect with disability based legislation? Emily posed the question of intersectionality, she specifically mentioned race and gender, however, an important question is how the social model can interact with legislation like the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). If a disability is defined individually then it is difficult to create a legislative framework in which the rights of disabled people are protected. I think it is easy to raise the question of whether the Americans with Disability act is simply creating more barriers or reinforcing the notion of disability, however, it is important to keep in mind that until 1990 Americans with disabilities did not have any legal protection from disability-based discrimination within the law. The act also tries to answer the question of accessibility creating a code that all buildings must follow so that they are accessible to the disabled. The definition of disabled within that law represents the medical model, it is simply a list of disabilities. The medical model is not the best way to define disability nor even a good way especially with the focus on "fixing the problem" but I would argue, in the case of law, it is an adequate definition to serve the purposes of the act. While this may be, as Emily said, an idealized form of western development it has provided at least some good things in terms of accessibility and prevention of discrimination.
ReplyDeleteEmily poses an interesting question about the dangers of grouping disability with other identity groups, however, there are dangers of perceiving all groups within the medical model of disability as a united front. Adams' point about disabled calling others by the acronym TAB (5) or temporarily able-bodied emphasizes why disability is so difficult to define. Unlike many identity groups, the barrier between able and disabled is very fluid. It could change from one day to the next. Because every single person experiences disability differently and people with the same disabilities experience their disabilities differently there is an inherent danger of the term, because even within a group of people with the same disability finding common ground between their experiences can be very difficult (7). Not to mention trying to find commonalities between groups of people with different disabilities. To conceptualize "the disabled" as a group of united people experiencing similar things is a mistake. Adams points to the conflict across different categories of disability as somewhat tense.
Emily poses a very important question regarding WHO gets to define what a disability is. Based on the above comments, many of the responses have circulated around the question of what that definition ought to be. However, one must first recognize that in order for a definition to truly capture the experience of disability, that definition must emerge from the disabled community. Linton highlights this point while discussing the terminology surrounding the disabled community when she claims that most of the existing terminology only "convey the boosterism and do-gooder mentality endemic to the paternalistic agencies that control many disabled people's lives" (14). Rather than focusing on trying to assign the disabled community a definition or trying to define what it means to be disabled, one must first recenter the approach to the disabled community. Absent a centering of the disabled, the nondisabled community will always create terms and definitions that, as Linton explains, will always be a form of "collective 'reaction formation" (16). In order to combat one's true feelings of fear or disdain toward disabled people, Linton explains that the nondisabled community will craft terms that gloss over the nondisabled community's initial feelings of hesitation or fear of disabled people. This reaction formation can be seen with terms such as "special", which has come to signify "other" rather than "outstanding" in the context of disability. Linton further draws on the importance of refocusing the discussion of disability from the perspective of the disabled community. Linton specifically sites an oral study that analyzed the perspectives of disabled Canadian war veterans. Linton explains that the veterans were punished by having their wheelchairs taken away from them (27-28). This form of punishment not only explains the manipulative power of the nondisabled community, but also demonstrates the need to refocus the attention on the disabled community. To the disabled war veteran, the wheel chair functioned as a liberating force. However, the nondisabled view the wheelchair as a restrictive burden. This conflict of interests demonstrates that when the nondisabled community is allowed to define disability, they will always frame it around the difference from the nondisabled. Furthermore, nondisabled people will frame this difference as negative because it strays from the "normal." Thus, by allowing disabled people to formulate their own definition and centering the definition around disabled people, the idea of the normal and abnormal will cease to exist in its traditional mode, for the disabled community can define their own experiences. This process of defining their own experiences will eliminate the need for a conflict between the normal and abnormal, thus allowing for a more appropriate and liberating definition of disability. Stella Young brilliantly explains the benefits of allowing disabled people to dictate what it means to experience disability. As Kyle and Max have already touched on, Young indicates that she believes that when disabled is no longer defined as deviant from the nondisabled population, the disabled will become the norm. This connects with Linton's discussion that I explained above. By refocusing the process of defining disability and centering it on disabled people, one no longer views disability as a problem, barrier, or a deviance from the norm. Rather, disability itself becomes the norm.
ReplyDeleteIn response to Emily's first question I think that in order to uphold the belief in the "social model" of disability a definition for disability must come from the person who's claiming disability. This is also required because of the concept that Linton brings up of being able to "pass". Even though trying to pass may often be to prevent discrimination, it often has occurred to hide an "embarrassment" to a family. Exemplified by families often changing the normal look of a child by removing a wheelchair or even removing the child itself out of the picture to cover up the fact that a child has an disability. This method of self-diagnoses has proven successful for people like the woman from the disability conference. Her acceptance of her disability was realized after her attempts to pass were hurting her own needs. Without having the power to define whether or not they're disabled many people will be cast in a perpetual struggle because they are unable to use their body to their full potential because they are unconsciously trying to pass for someone they are not. However, as Linton talked about the normality that society is built for many people may be considered abnormal and fit under the social model of disability like taller people and people with higher IQ scores. I don't believe these people deserve to believe people like this deserve to be called or diagnose themselves as disabled. To prevent this exploitation of the social model of disability by people like this or people who believe that we all are a little bit disabled some oversight must be given by the cultural model of disability. In the Adams, Reiss, and Serlin article they propose that disabled people see the world through a lens that affects how they see their own body interact with an environment. Meaning that the "relationship between body and society" ( 9, Adams, Reiss, and Serlin) should also be included in defining disability. This still all requires the precedent that to be disabled your disability must be considerably affect your daily life.
ReplyDeleteEmily asked a question of how disability can be grouped with identity, such as gender or race, and whether or not this is helpful or harmful. I think firstly to explain this we have to consider that in sixteenth century England, disability was used to define not only people with physical and mental capabilities we today associate with disability, but also people who were "unable to pay debt or to worship God with a full heart" (6, Adams, Reiss, Serlin). This brings up a key characteristic of disability, that disability is fluid. What is disability changes in time as different social or cultural norms are glorified. For example, in the early United States being black was considered inferior and a disadvantage; being black was a disability. This example sheds light on Emily's question of whether or not grouping disability with identity is dangerous or not. I believe it is dangerous to group disability with identity because often times identities are defined by social constructs. Grouping disability with identity gives people (socially who determines disability) the power to deem one group as inferior to another, and more importantly, by naming them as disabled, in a social sense it essentially allows that group to be treated as "wrong" and hindrances to society. This can also be dangerous because "by the 19th century disabled people were institutionalized and attempted to be medically 'corrected'" (7 Adams, Reiss, Serlin). This gives way to extremely dangerous medical procedures which attempt to fix an identity disability, which cannot be changed through medical intervention. An example of this were the dangerous electric shock therapies given to patients to cure homosexuality. In conclusion, disability is a fluid idea which is consistently defined as the opposite of society's ideals. Therefore identity is often misconstrued as a disability, and can often lead to harmful social and medical consequences.
ReplyDeleteI commented this, not Unknown
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