Given that this class is a disability studies class, I recognize that many of you will disagree with and may even find the Singer article rather repulsive. However, I would first like to begin by analyzing why Singer concludes what he does on certain issues. Singer utilizes a truly utilitarian framing when analyzing the issue of infanticide. According to Singer, the birth of a disabled infant may "turn the normally joyful event of birth into a threat to the happiness of the parents, and any other children they may have." According to Singer, a disabled infant is most likely to live a life that is less valuable and pleasurable than that of an able-bodied infant. Before we hasten to dismiss the absurdity of Singer's arguments, I think it is important to note that Singer's claim carries some validity. Given the way that society has been constructed so as to limit accessibility to things such transportation, labor, and independent living for disabled individuals, Singer's claim appears to be true. However, operating solely upon a utilitarian calculus runs into some serious problems. Singer's analysis fails to analyze the structural issues that shape the disabled infant's life in such a way. Furthermore, Singer's claim assumes that because these disabled infants do not possess the ability to determine for themselves as to whether or not they wish to live, it is up to outside forces to make that decision for them. The problem here is that this decision assumes that the disabled individuals would be willing to die. If it is true that they cannot make the delineation between life and death, why should they not be given the chance to make that decision later on in life? Operating from a purely utilitarian standpoint, Singer's argument makes sense; there would be more "value" if the child were to die at an earlier age. Singer then goes on to explain his views regarding voluntary euthanasia, which I will be focusing most of my discussion on. Singer's argument revolves fundamentally around the idea that the individual is a rational, self-conscious being that has chosen death. This argument, once again, seems like a perfectly logical conclusion. However, the problem with all three of Singer's assumptions is that none of them analyze the underlying political, economic, and social forces that dictate the realities for the disabled individuals places in these situations. Thus, I turn to Braswell and Longmore to offer some critical insights on this issue.
Braswell indicates that physician assisted suicide (PAS) ought not to be viewed through a biological lens, but rather through a lens that understands the social forces surrounding the individual's decision. According to Braswell, "the suffering of individuals eligible for euthanasia is due... to social discrimination against the incurably sick and disabled. Desire to die among these populations occurs when the patients internalize this discrimination" (80). The call for euthanasia ought not to be understood as a rational plea for the end to one's suffering, but rather as a signal that the disabled individual is facing extreme pressure from societal forces. This understanding interacts very well with Longmore's analysis.
Longmore isolates several problems with PAS. Longmore's first argument is that the US health system and society write large is geared toward the discrimination of disabled individuals. In the case of Lary McAfree, the hospital placed him in the ICU for a prolonged period of time. According to Longmore, the constant light, noise, and chaos can cause a person to experience "ICU psychosis" (182). Due to McAfree's continued exposure to this environment, he experienced extreme psychological breakdowns. However, Longmore notes that McAfree never experienced proper psychological evaluation (182). This failure to provide proper treatment emerges from what Longmore describes as "a health care system and society pervaded with discrimination and prejudice against people with disabilities" (178). Such an analysis calls into questions Singer's assumption of a rational individual. Instead, these individuals appear to be victims to extremely harsh conditions imposed upon them by the medical system. The fact that doctors are constantly urging them to sign Do Not Resuscitate forms only compounds the situation, as it proves that the medical system "pays only lip service to 'autonomy' and 'freedom of choice' for disabled people" (Longmore, 178).
Furthermore, Longmore argues that "deployment of notions like 'dignity' and 'dependency'... are highly value-laden concepts that in and of themselves shape perceptions" (190). The argument that the disabled individual's life is less valuable only serves to reify the image of the ideal American citizen: the white, able-bodied, affluent male. In fact, Longmore cites a survey in which a majority of disabled individuals rated their lives as valuable and worth living (179). The reason why people view disability as detracting form a person's quality of life is because becoming disabled is associated with dependency, causing one "to become the inversion of what a real American is supposed to be" (190). This analysis relates to our discussions of intersectionality as well as some of the discussions on the immigration unit. The central notion of the American identity revolves around the deal demos - a population of white, able-bodied, individualistic ruffians who conduct an honest work. The problem with this assertion is that it necessarily excludes disabled individuals, people of color, women, and other social minorities. However, relating back to last week's discussion on 'Disability Pride," Longmore indicates that the disability rights movement in general has understood 'self-determination' in a significantly different way from the majority culture" (190-191). Thus, one recognizes the powerful potential within disability activism in the context of PAS. Singer's struggle is that he assumes that disabled individuals will inherently live a life less valuable than that of an able-bodied individual. However, Longmore's analysis demonstrates that these notions of value rely on a fundamentally able-bodied conception of value. Instead, Longmore argues, we must recognize that the perception of lost value a. emerges form social discrimination toward disabled individuals and b. is not necessarily lost value according to disabled individuals.
Finally, I would like to briefly touch on the issue of class as it relates to Longmore's discussion. Longmore discusses several problematic corporation such as Ethix Corporation, Humana, and OMAP. I found the OMAP example particularly disturbing and exemplary of the way in which class intersects with disability on the issue of PAS. Longmore indicates that OMAP cut funding for a series of anti-depressant drugs, AIDS drugs, in-home services, etc. and continued funding of PAS. Longmore indicates that this decision demonstrated "a declaration of class-warfare against the poor, many of whom are sick or disabled" (194). The problem with the free-market in the US appears to be that everything has become privatized, even health. Thus, corporations dictate the access to different medical treatments based upon profit margins. Combined with the fact that disabled people have very little access to labor or a steady wage means that companies choose to favor PAS, and because disabled and poor people can't afford alternative treatments, they are seemingly forced into choosing PAS. The decision no longer seems autonomous. Rather, it is forced onto these individuals via market pressures.
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| A cartoon highlights the problem with corporate care-management and the way in which it forces people to choose PAS. |
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| A very interesting 13 minute documentary about one of the most recent, publicized end of life/euthanasia debates |
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| A pro-PAS protestor stands outside the SCOTUS. Notice the language of liberty. Longwell argues that the choice for PAS is not truly liberty, but rather a "masked" forced choice.
Longmore, Braswell, and Singer all provide very interesting analysis. However, it seems that only an understanding of the social, political, and economic forces can allow one to truly recognize the corruption inherent within the PAS system. There are many issues that I did not discuss, which I have geared my questions toward in the hope that you all will discuss them. Therefore, I propose the following questions:
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1. How does a class based analysis aid a disability based analysis and vice versa? How might they detract from one another?
2. Why does Longmmore assume that PAS is justified for terminally ill people? Are there any problems with his assumption? (see Felicia Ackerman in the Braswell article.)
3. How might the ethical framing shape our understanding of PAS? i.e. Singer uses utilitarianism. Would a libertarianism, kantian, consequentialist, etc. framing impact our understanding of the issue?
4. In other countries, life prolonging techniques are not pursued as aggressively due to cultural or practical matters such as affordability or access. What is the difference between PAS and these cultures? Would PAS be justified in these areas? More broadly, is there ever a moment in which a person with disability may have a legitimate request for PAS.
5. Longmore concludes that any discussion of policies regarding PAS should require the presence of members of the disability rights movement. Should members of other social minorities also be present for such discussions?
6. Both Singer and Longmore discuss the comparison between Nazi eugenics and PAS. Which one of them is correct in their analysis?
7. Longmore discusses gender as a specific instance of intersectionality within the issue of PAS. How might an intersectional (gender/disability) analyis of PAS aid our understanding of the issue? Relate this to the issue of the ideal American man.
8. Strategic Essentialism?
8. Strategic Essentialism?
To discuss Longmmore’s assumptions about PAS for disabled individuals compared that of terminally ill individuals, one must understand his central argument about the role of choice and societal conditions that influence whether or not one decides to live or die. Longmmore attributes many individuals’ wish to die to “undertreated pain and unnecessary suffering” (177). Longmmore uses notes from medical practitioners to prove his points about discrimination in not only society but also specifically amongst doctors treating disability who sometimes struggled to see the value in disabled lives. It seems problematic to have individuals make choices about living and dying while often not hearing all of their options or while facing a discriminatory system where they don’t receive proper treatment. Longmmore problematizes the conditions of society, which put disabled people in the position of requesting physician-assisted suicide. Yet, Longmmore connects his argument of the discriminatory societal connections to his point about terminal illness, which he suggests could justify PAS because of the lack of meaningfully quality life (180). This assumption seems problematic in the sense that it falls into the same logic that Longmmore criticizes by relying on the idea that death proves more desirable than dependency (190). There does seem somewhat of a distinction between disability and terminal illness in the way that stigma operates, yet there seem many overlaps in assumptions and experiences concerning the ideals of self-determination and majority culture.
ReplyDeleteBraswell presents a counter-view to Longmmore’s argument by citing Felicia Ackerman who argues against distinctions between disability and terminal illness because of the way that euthanasia campaigns devalue both types of lives (80). Further, one runs into the problem of euthanasia’s availability for one group being used to “coerce that group into suicide” (80). One cannot analyze the euthanasia without considering the social practices that implicate the decision. Yet, Braswell does agree with Longmmore in that many of these explanations neglect the harm caused by prolonged treatment.
Braswell and Longmmore’s arguments seem to mostly focus on the individuals directly involved in the decision, yet Singer extends his analysis to those who cannot make the choice to die by discussing disabled infants. His utilitarian view seems somewhat troubling in that it relies on the ability of one individual to predict the future happiness of another. A utilitarian view could suggest children as replaceable since that would promote greater total happiness at the expense of the disabled child’s life (5). He uses his justifications to say that “killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person” (7). Yet, he relies on principles of rationality and autonomy to determine who ought to be allowed to determine their fate. His argument values the autonomous and conscious subject, which then subordinates other groups based on lack of value due to their distance from these perceived desirable traits. This logic seems somewhat of a slippery slope, as it allows others to make decisions for those they deem as not fully rational. We’ve read in past week about how that type of logic make possible the exclusion of other identity groups based on their deviance from perceived mental ideals such as with scientific racism.
*Longmore
DeleteCorrection on behalf of both Sam and Emily
Hello, this week, I will concentrate on the application of utilitarian ethics on euthanasia.
ReplyDeleteFirst, the Braswell article touches on hospice programs, and how they might be a better alternative to euthanasia. In looking at a hospice program through a utilitarian lens, a couple of arguments (both for and against) come to mind. First, isolating dying people would accomplish a greater good for the greater amount of people. For the patients themselves, a comfortable place to live would outweigh a crowded, loud hospital ward. These programs “promote meaningful life [for patients] with terminal illness" (81). However, in viewing hospice in a lens that holds individual autonomy in highest regard, it functions almost as a prison. With regulated meals, activities, and constant supervision, those enrolled have little control over their decisions.
Likewise, the clash between utilitarian values and those of individual choice is illuminated in the Longmore document, when Longmore writes about the “slippery slope” contained in involuntary euthanasia. If doctors, policemen, and governmental officials decide the circumstances in which killing another is appropriate, then perhaps they will move to killings outside of the medical realm (185). If a government wields that power, than perhaps it could legally kill those with differing political views—a clearly extreme case. Here, the right to life may only be waived by the person him/herself. It is clear that utilitarian values could lead to undeserved killings by an outside force.
Lastly, in the Singer document, the utilitarian framework is applied to euthanasia in general. Sam previously discussed how Singer utilizes a utilitarian framework. By assigning different values to different lives (ex: a comatose and brain-dead patient versus a conscious and sentient adult), Singer proves theoretical involuntary euthanasia, while immoral, to increase general utility (11). In this case, utilitarianism does not grant agency to those patients. For example, many patients are pressured into signing DNR forms. The lack of agency, in this case, nullifies the patient’s capability to make an informed decision.
I believe an interesting argument Singer proposes in his paper is that of Thalidomide. If viewed in a way that does not disvalue disablement, the drug, even with its capability to affect a fetus’s health, would be considered a wonderful way of curing morning sickness. However, if one switches lenses and views disablement in a negative, undesirable way, the drug becomes a deforming agent (6). This example showcases the extreme differences a slight change of mindset can produce.
Hello all, this week I was particularly interested in Sam’s question about members of different groups being present in discussions on policy regarding PAS.
ReplyDeleteFor me, one of the most important parts of the readings this week was Longmore’s investigation of the rhetoric that surrounds the PAS debate. As he points out, “the catchphrase “quality of life” is frequently invoked to justify” PAS (188). The idea of a “quality of life” is often based in a discourse that will “invoke the loss of “dignity” while simultaneously raising the specter of “dependency” “ (188). As we have learned in our investigation of disability history over the course of the year, the importance of rhetoric in shaping policy and perception is incredibly important. The ideas of a loss of “dignity” and a perpetual state of “dependency” certainly promote ablest notions and legitimize an action like PAS without first questioning the motive behind the action; this theme has been ever present, from Baynton’s analysis of immigration to the existence of freak shows and asylums. As Stephen Drake explained in a response to Dr. Jack Kevorkian’s explanation of PAS, ablest rhetoric “reinforces and lethally acts out the devaluing attitudes of our society that tell sick or disabled people they lack dignity… and would be better off dead” (189).
Because rhetoric is so important, and often an ablest society uses that rhetoric and accepts the notions it promotes without great awareness, Longmore’s argument in favor of representation must extend to members of all social minorities. Just as discourse normalizes violence towards disabled bodies, it normalizes violence toward any other marginalized group. For example, when the AP US textbook called slaves “immigrant workers,” that education discourse was a form of erasure and was incredibly problematic. In forming new policy, language and rhetoric are of the upmost importance.
Instead of simply policing discourse, the presence of different groups in policy formation as a whole, including that regarding PAS, is a must. In analysis of the history of disability, people who are not aware of its implications often use violent or otherizing discourse. To take a brief detour to examine this phenomenon, Peter Singer most definitely falls into this trap. Not only does he create an otherizing binary by arguing for a difference “between killing disabled and normal infants,” but he also claims that in the view of the parents, they may “want even the most gravely disabled infant to live as long as possible” (4). Even in qualifying his argument, Singer’s assertion that under rare circumstance a parent could want “the most gravely disabled infant” reinforces an assumption that the quality of being disabled is undesirable in the first place. Singer assumes that disability is a problem, and therein lays the real problem. While Singer may not be the most moderate example that can prove how the public – including ourselves – may use discourse violently, the example nevertheless explains how discourse is used.
Due to the discourse that so often allows for violent or otherwise problematic assumptions about social minority groups, involvement among them all is necessary in order to more adequately combat oppression. Involving those who are most affected by violent discourse and assumptions involves those who may better combat that discourse in the first place. Specifically for PAS, involvement of other groups may be valuable in combatting underlying forms of violence towards specific marginalized groups in PAS legislation. However, the involvement of disability rights activists is of particular importance for PAS legislation given its incredibly broad ablest notions.
One other thing I found: a political cartoon specific to the disability rights movement's take on the issue:
Deletehttp://www.second-thoughts.org/home/files/cartoon.jpg
Just thought it was an interesting resource.
I’d like to address Sam’s question regarding the ethical structure of PAS discussions ( How might the ethical framing shape our understanding of PAS? i.e. Singer uses utilitarianism. Would a libertarianism, kantian, consequentialist, etc. framing impact our understanding of the issue?) and problematize Singer’s tacit acceptance of certain standards of value in developing his position on euthanizing disabled infants.
ReplyDeleteOne of the central standards that Singer deploys revolves around an understanding of pleasurability and value of life as directly related. Singer specifically puts forth this perception when arguing, “When the life of an infant will be so miserable as not to be worth living…it is better that the child be helped to die without further suffering…[especially] when the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life” (4-5). Here, Singer accepts two guiding principles: that happiness of life determines value and that disabled people are necessarily less happy. Additionally, the necessity only for a probability of a happier child to be born in order to justify the euthanasia of a disabled one reinforces the predominancy of perceived happiness within this structure.
Needless to say, the arbitrary determination required to dictate a person’s future happiness and value by level of disability (Singer claims haemophiliacs do live worthwhile lives (5)) is absurd. Longmore discredits Singers assertions statistically when noting that “eight out of ten people with quadriplegia…said they had an average or better-than-average quality of life” (178). Furthermore, even if one assumes that disabled people live unhappy lives, questions must be asked if a happiness metric is at all appropriate to determine whether a life should or should not exist. However, the most significant problem with Singer’s argument is not his justification of the use of these standards of value but that he does not justify them at all. Assuming that these principles are perfectly viable tools for understanding individual worth, Singer’s concatenating conclusions seem perfectly logical. Nevertheless, in introducing his viewpoint on the legitimacy of euthanasia for disabled infants, Singer in no way works to provide any argument as to why disabled people are necessarily miserable and therefore not as valuable, taking for granted the applicability of these structures (4-5). In many ways, this framing of his analysis mirrors widely held societal beliefs that refuse “to comprehend the socially oppressive experiences that make the lives of some people with disabilities unbearable,” misattributing the misery of existence upon the individual (Longmore 184).
Singer reiterates this willingness to accept widely held social norms as valid when discussing the replaceability of fetuses and infants. He first notes, “That a fetus is known to be disabled is widely accepted as grounds for abortion,” and then continues, “I cannot see how one could defend the view that fetuses may be replaced before birth, but newborns may not be” (6). It must be noted that arguing that abortion of fetuses is similar to euthanasia of infants in no way provides a necessary ethical conclusion on whether all of these individuals should or should not be able to be euthanized. Only Singer’s acknowledgement of the social acceptability of aborting a fetus serves as the justification for why disabled newborns should also be replaceable, again demonstrating the power current social norms and beliefs have in determining his argumentative structure.
I would like to respond to Sam’s question regarding Nazism and eugenics. While I appreciate Sam’s initial explanation of Singer’s text and his attempt to preempt the inevitable “Singer is ableist” claim, I think we risk granting too much credence to many of Singer’s claims by our attempt to objectively analyze each document. While Singer does attempt to justify infanticide and PAS by explaining the various types of euthanasia (voluntary, involuntary, and non-voluntary), he ultimately cannot escape the criticism of his work as a glorification of eugenics, which is why Longmore’s article is on the whole more persuasive to me. I will start by drawing attention to some of the more problematic parts of Singer’s work, and then will explain my thoughts in context of Longmore’s text.
ReplyDeleteSinger begins by explaining, “Characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness…make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics” (3). Here, he explains how infanticide is justified because infants are less than human. Ironically, the defining characteristics of “consciousness,” “autonomy,” and “rationality” are all premised upon ableist notions of subjectivity wherein a “normal” person is one that is “rational” and “autonomous.” However, much of what we have been previously learning suggests that people use rhetoric such as “rationality” to stigmatize disabled individuals. Thus, the characteristics that make infants killable thereby also make disabled individuals killable by not being fully “rational” or having complete consciousness.
Second, Singer seems to make a forced tradeoff. He writes, “When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed” (5). While he attempts to provide an example of how a disabled child is potentially preventing the birth of a healthy child, this tradeoff seems illogical and rare, even if potentially true in some instances. While killing a disabled child may lead to the conditions for the birth of a non-disabled child, the killing of that disabled child does not directly lead to the birth of a non-disabled child.
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Finally (despite the fact that there are so many more examples of this ableism throughout the essay), Singer just asserts that the disabled experience is inherently lesser than the non-disabled experience. He writes, “…it suggests to disabled people living today that their lives are less worth living…Yet it is surely flying in the face of reality to deny that, on average, this is so” (6). Potentially this would be less problematic if Singer’s argument was that disabled people often experience more pain or less-than-average life quality. However, it is important to note that Singer’s argument is that “their lives are less worth living” than non-disabled people. He actively devalues the lives of disabled people, in large part due to the utilitarian frame he applies and the forced trade offs he creates above. Braswell acknowledges how this frame of mind leads to the Nazi-esque eugenics mindset when he writes, “Euthanasia advocates…considered the incurably ill to be social costly and argued that eliminating them would promote a more egalitarian distribution of wealth” (79).
ReplyDeleteThe notion of agency and choice is a recurring theme throughout each text. Singer attempts to justify voluntary euthanasia by arguing that those people have a choice. However, the most persuasive part of Longmore’s essay is the fact that the entire text is a criticism of the underlying reliance on the “agency” argument. For Longmore, reliance on euthanasia and PAS represents an abdication of responsibility for complacency in an ableist society. He writes, “The living will ignores the societally constructed circumstances that can deny both terminally ill people and people with disabilities a ‘meaningful quality of life’” (180). Not only does this refute the choice argument, but also makes that claim that even if disabled people experience a lower quality of life, that is a product of societal norms. Euthanasia tends to only focus on the medicalized understanding of disability, without explaining why social factors stigmatize medical disabilities, such as when Longmore writes of Wally Spolar, who didn’t fear his disability, but rather “’ending up in one of those rat-infested nursing homes’” (187-188).
While suicide might be a legitimate option for some people, Longmore argues that the desire for suicide is the product of ableist society. He elaborates, “Disability rights activists noted the absolute failure of most nondisabled people to acknowledge the abuse and oppression by the system that causes suicidal despair in disabled people” (183). Even if Singer is right that the quality of life for disabled people is lower than non-disabled people, Longmore articulates that people like Singer who characterize disabled people as less legitimate is what leads to suicidal tendencies in the first place. There is an economic incentive to do so, which Sam touched on so I won’t spend too much time talking about, but eliminating the “excess” of society from a utilitarian standpoint would be beneficial, so it is no surprise that people like Singer attempt to devalue disabled people at every turn. Thus, it is important to note that the arguments for choice and agency are all based upon some false notion of autonomy that actually does not exist because society has attempted to glorify euthanasia in a utilitarian and economic way that tries to hide its violent tendencies through claims to “autonomy.” Singer is an excellent example of someone who attempts to appear progressive by granting disabled people agency, but Longmore exposes this belief system as nothing more than utilitarian and economic eugenics in disguise, which is what causes disabled people to want to commit suicide in the first place.
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In this blog post, I would like to discuss Sam’s question regarding the ethical framework behind PAS, and in particular infanticide, which Singer discusses. All three of the documents talk about the ethical aspect of PAC and euthanasia. However, each case of euthanasia creates very different situations in which the justification for it changes. I would just like to point out that there is no single definition or line to be crossed that determines when Pas or euthanasia is justified or not.
ReplyDeleteTo begin, Braswell promotes the idea that euthanasia for disabled people is “not due to a person’s biological condition but to social discrimination against the incurable sick” (80). This idea, focused on the social model of disability, directly conflicts with Singer’s argument that disabled people live such terrible lives that they if they wish to commit suicide then they should have the “individual freedom and autonomy” to “decide whether their situation is bearable” (10). In essence, both authors agree that ableist societies discriminated against disabled people, which is a societal flaw. However, they both disagree on one major thing: Braswell views it as a result of society devaluing the lives of terminal sick and physical disabled while Signer views it as putting them out of their “miserable lives.”
The interesting part of this ethical debate is how Singer justifies PAC and euthanasia. According to Singer, parents may regret ever having a child if he or she turns out of be disabled, which would justify the killing of the baby. He gives two main reasons for why it would be fine to kill it (4). First off, he argues that life starts when the being is self-conscious, which babies are not, and therefore the killing of the baby is not equal to the normal human. However, this ideology creates a hierarchy in which certain life does not matter. For example by claiming life is only when a being is conscious, all people in coma’s or perceived mentally dependent are immediately marked as lower and less valuable, which would justify their death. Therefore, this belief merely creates a society that ranks it citizens on how valuable they are perceived. Secondly, he promotes the utilitarian mindset of infant as replaceable (5). By objectifying babies and devaluing disabled people, Singer argues that if a family kills a disabled baby and has a “normal” baby instead, the overall trade off of the quality of life each baby would have had justifies the killing of the disabled baby. However, like Sam points out in his initial blog post, by solely using a utilitarian framework, he immediately generalizes disabled peoples as worse than abled bodied people; hence, he forces the idea that disabled people don’t want to live and would rather die, which takes agency away from this minority group once again. Throughout the readings, we see a continual thematic string of public policies being made those not directly affect by the decision.
Lastly, I believe that Longmore does a nice job of answer Singer’s claim that disable people want to die by arguing that it is the extreme social stigmatization and discrimination that force disabled people to want to commit suicide (181). Early in his chapter, Longmore uses Rivlin and McAfee as clear examples showing how the societal factors and PUBLIC POLCIES made it so unendurable that they wished to kill themselves rather than live in this ableist society.
As a last note, I wanted to bring up the Longmore’s argument about the health care system and its double standard. What I find intriguing about his argument is that if a person without a disability wanted to commit suicide, they would get help and intervention. On the contrary if a disabled person said that, they would be deemed “rational” (183). This double standard once again supports my earlier claim that society has created a hierarchy based on ability status to devalue and trivialize the lives of disabled people as inferior, unable, and dependent and our public policies and attitudes towards disabled people reflect it.
I would like to respond to Sam’s question regarding different ethical framings of PAS.
ReplyDeleteSinger’s utilitarian justifications for PAS appear very problematic on first glance as they are frequently founded on blatantly ableist justifications that devalue the lives of disabled individuals. In his discussion of infanticide, Singer closes by stating “killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all” (7). Although Singer provides well thought out and justified claims for this harsh conclusion, his bold statement appears problematic as it greatly devalues the lives and potential future lives of an entire minority population. I find Singer’s invocations of morals in this situation problematic as he extends a utilitarian justification to determine the inherent moral worth of a human. Under his interpretation, he determines that people derive their moral significance based on their potential pleasure, which devalues some people, but at the same time is not a practical or feasible approach to these issues. Singer determines that because a disabled child will likely not experience the same pleasure as a nondisabled child in the future that a “mercy killing” is justifiable. If we analyze this situation in a pure vacuum it can appear justifiable through a utilitarian lens, but of course his philosophy in practice is unjustifiable for many people.
Singer’s analysis is also problematic as he creates a distinction between “a disabled infant” and a “person.” Singer is incredibly hypocritical in this analysis as in his earlier work he argued that animals ought to be valued as equivalents in utilitarian calculus but now argues that disabled people (who are not human in his argument) should not be treated as equals. Many scholars have criticized Singer’s work for privileging animals above disabled humans. His justification for infanticide shows the hypocrisy of his work where he will argue that it is not justifiable for a human to kill an animal but he will later argue that infanticide or euthanasia of disabled people is justified.
Singer notes that under his interpretations of utilitarian ethics it would mostly be justifiable to practice voluntary forms of euthanasia in which people make an autonomous and informed decision to commit suicide. Longmore addresses this issue and notes that “Under the pressures of cost containment, profit seeking, and prejudice, the choices were surely not free and uncoerced ones” and that “the U.S. health care system – pays only lip service to ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom of choice’ for disabled people” (178). Longmore aptly notes an area that Singer strategically does not address: implied and explicit coercion. Singer’s argument that PAS is justified when it is a conscious choice appears very unpersuasive when we recognize the vast amounts of societal pressure inevitably determines a person’s choice to opt for assisted suicide. Further recognizing the structurally discriminatory practices of “the U.S. health care system” we can further understand that a purely autonomous decision regarding assisted suicide is practically impossible in America.
DeleteNext I would like to address how a libertarian or rights based approach to PAS can reshape our understanding of this controversial issue. Longmore addresses that although nearly equal amounts of disabled and nondisabled individuals reported their quality of life as poor that “no one but the most fundamentalist of libertarians wants to offer physician assisted suicide to all those miserable nondisabled people” (179). I find this very interesting but also problematic as it represents ingrained ableist assumptions in American society. If we view the PAS scenario focusing on individual liberties and lack of governmental coercion we would most likely draw the conclusion that a person would have the right to “waive [their] right to life” (Singer 9). Thus, regardless of disability or any other considerations, PAS would appear justifiable and would be an expression of one’s individual expression of bodily autonomy in which a person would choose to embrace their rights or “wave one’s rights if one so chooses” (Singer 9). This is also true with a discussion of John Stuart Mill’s argument that “The individual’s own good … is not a proper reason for state intervention” (11). A purely rights based focus would argue that the government can not impede a person’s decision to give up one’s right to life in any instance.
1. How does a class based analysis aid a disability based analysis and vice versa? How might they detract from one another?
ReplyDeleteI think that a class based analysis or one based off economics would be useful in understanding both of the articles. Both Singer and Longmore make claims about when if it is ever justified to participate in PAS. I think both authors make claims or intend to make the reader consider how a life should be evaluated and what should make a life valuable. Evaluating societal responses in terms of economic productivity has been a theme within the class and is equally applicable here. Longmore doesn't attempt to focus on the reason that disabled people have social status that is devalued within society but just asserts that they do (196). Singer does not dispute the claim that people with disabilities have less value in society in fact agrees that the lives of the disabled are less worthy than those of an able bodied individual. Singer's justification for euthanasia is centered around his simplistic understanding of suffering and what makes lives valuable. (https://philosophynow.org/issues/59/Ten_Reasons_Why_I_Love_Hate_Peter_Singer (the latter half of this article is fairly interesting as to why Singer's understanding of the world and philosophies come from a place of privilege)) His utilitarian calculations of what life is valuable and what life isn't don't distinguish between animals and humans but do distinguish between humans who are destines to suffer their entire life. Singer makes judgements about what life is worth living with an outright condemnation of people who allow their children or people around them to suffer. A class based analysis helps shine light on the fact that the people who are being pushed to participate in PAS or sign a DNR in hospitals are people who are considered to be without a future. With people who are terminally ill it is intensely apparent why PAS could be an appealing solution to someone who will most likely die in the next six months. When the question becomes someone who will die in the next six years though the same logic could be used to justify PAS. If someone is with absolute certainty going to die in the next six years with their quality of life becoming worse and worse than through an extension of the logic above allowing them to take their own life would correspondingly be justified. This logic is obviously problematic particularly in the context of people who have disabilities and are otherwise part of groups of people in society whose lives are consistently devalued. Because of the medical understanding of disability that has dominated the way disability is understood grouping disability into the consideration of a "incurable illness" might seem more intuitive (180). What I mean to say is that health care officials have a simpler time explaining the justification for offering PAS to people with disabilities because society has determined that because people with disabilities cannot engage in society in the same way an able bodied person can that prolonging their life is useless because they lack an economic future.
(Now to the economics part)
Longmore argues that disabled people often cannot meet the ideal american standard of "physical self-sufficiency" and are on that basis deemed less valuable because they depend on society (190). Most disability scholars would argue that dependence on society is not negative or that disabled people are only dependent upon society because society is constructed in a way that bars them access without assistance. Longmore makes some very interesting arguments about the corporate aspects of the PAS industry. That in medicine whether the choice is to end a life of prolong a life someone is still earning money. Additionally, Longmore makes an interesting argument about the underlying eugenic nature of PAS that is motivated by economic pressures (195).
DeleteThat the concept of dependence reifies the idea that people with disabilities are forced to be dependent upon the state. The state in both the Rivlin and McCafee examples Longmore uses, is unwilling to support the costs of living for someone with disabilities but is willing to spend money when they express a wish to kill themselves. This is telling in Longmore's analysis of what Singer would describe as a stark utilitarian society prioritizes. The society prioritizes spending money on the health and recovery on people who were not going to be dependent on the state for their entire life. The primary purpose of eugenics is to create a workforce that is the most physically fit and the least dependent upon society or the government which I think aids the economic considerations of the PAS. If you view the PAS movement as one that is primarily focused on giving people with disabilities the right to choose whether they live or die you must also take into account that by giving people with disabilities that "right" there is always the implication that the death of someone with disabilities is less significant than the death of someone able and not terminally ill and therefore gives less value to the life of someone with disabilities.
Link to the Leonard article if anyone is interested it's just about the economics of Eugenics: https://www.princeton.edu/~tleonard/papers/retrospectives.pdf
Hello all today I will be discussing Sam’s question on the intersectionality between gender and disability within the issue of PAS and how this aids our understanding of the issue. Longmore discusses this as a combination of “disability bias” and “gender bias”(186). He supports this claim by showing higher numbers of women were euthanized; “seven out of ten” of Jack Kevorkian’s “patients” were women and “two out of three” of the victims of “mercy killings” were women, even though “two out of three killers” (186) were men. Connections between Longmore and Braswell point out that specific causes for women choosing euthanasia apply to the entire population. In Longmore he argues that systematic discrimination in the form of “poorer medical care” (187) led women to “internalize this institutional prejudice” lowering their self worth. This is incorporated in Braswell’s argument on the cause of the “desire to die” (80) being the internalization of social discrimination. This intersection shows how the singular plights of women could be linked to the difficulties faced by the whole. The reason for this trend in “mercy killings” of more men killing women even though “most caregivers are women” (187) for terminally ill and disabled people is that when a women becomes a terminally ill or disabled person there is a “reversal in caring responsibilities” (187). This change in roles is unacceptable for men who believe in the social construct that women should have a role meant to give comfort to the male breadwinner. After becoming disabled, these women enter into a new society that is built to exclude them, so to enter back into their previous role men will “mercy kill” the individual they blame for their current role. Making the cause of the death very contradictory to the common name it is given, mercy kill, because the name implies the reason for the killing to be in the best interest of the killed; however, it is almost always in the interest of the killer. To liberate the men in their life through PAS was seen as a “sacrifice”. This sense of sacrifice in PAS was “presented as a way disabled people could do something useful” (187) for a society that had been built to exclude them and that denied the ability to reach achievement forcing them to choose between life as a burden or to be euthanized and emancipate those whose life they were a burden on. This was not really a choice after all.
ReplyDeleteI will be answering Sam’s question: Both Singer and Longmore discuss the comparison between Nazi eugenics and PAS. Which one of them is correct in their analysis?
ReplyDeleteI think Singer’s analysis of the comparison between Nazi eugenics and PAS is more correct and convincing than Longmore’s. Singer claims, “The case for killing other human beings, in certain circumstances, is strong…this is not something to be regarded with horror, and the use of the Nazi analogy is utterly misleading” (1). He describes the Nazi analogy as the argument that “the Nazi extermination programme is a recent and terrible example of what can happen once we give the state the power to MI innocent human beings” (1). In other words, the Nazi regime systematically murdered disabled people, and giving the state power to euthanize is a slippery slope to the civil rights atrocities of the Nazi Regime. The main reason I believe Singer’s analysis is correct is because Longmore’s assumes all reasoning behind euthanasia is based in eugenics and the goal to “purify” a whole state/community. Longemore claims, “[Disability rights activists] felt disturbed too, though not really surprised, that advocates of physician-assisted suicide failed to condemn…neo-Nazi bigotry against disabled people” (186). Although Longmore hints at the point that disability is frequently seen as inferior and therefore less valuable, this comparison to the Nazi ideology is too great a stretch because he is suggesting that PAS is rooted in the ideas of eugenics. Additionally, through this analysis, Longmore fails to acknowledge other reasons and types of euthanasia. In this comparison Longmore does not consider euthanasia for the purposes to end suffering, because the disabled/ill individual cannot be taken care of (due to financial or other reasons), nor voluntary euthanasia where the individual desires to end their life. In contrast, Singer recognizes these possibilities when he states, “The case for killing other human beings, in certain circumstances, is strong” (1). I agree with Singer’s point because I believe there are times it is more inhumane to not kill a person than to kill them, however because of Longmore’s comparison to the Nazi regime he discredits these possible situations. Singer’s analysis is more correct than Longmore’s because, in short, it does not totally generalize euthanasia and rather attempts to view it through different perspectives.